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Abstract 
The paper argues that a satisficing consumer decision equalizes marginal costs of search for 
satisficing price with the marginal benefit of search where the marginal costs of search are equal 
to the marginal loss in labor income and the marginal benefit of search is equal to the marginal 
savings on purchase. When the liquidity constraint is soft, a consumer maximizes the utility of 
his consumption-leisure choice with regard to the equality of marginal values of search. 
Therefore, the satisficing decision becomes optimal. And the equilibrium price of the satisficing 
optimal choice becomes equal to the willingness to accept. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The discussion between the search-satisficing concept and the neoclassical paradigm has a long 
story. In 1957 H.Simon revived the Scottich word satisficing to denote decision making that set 
an aspiration level and searched until an alternative, satisfactory by the aspiration level criterion, 
was found. The confrontation between two approaches had reached its peak in 1977 when 
H.Simon presented his Richard T. Ely Lecture. Then, the discussion went into decline, but from 
time to time researchers in different fields animated it (see for example Slote 1989, Schwartz et 
al. 2002, Fellner et al. 2006). As a result, the theory of consumer behavior has accepted the strict 
distinction between “maximizers” and “satisficers” (Lewer et al. 2009). Unfortunately, 
opponents have forgot the fact that H.Simon himself paid attention to the possibility of matching 
the satisficing and optimizing procedures. In 1972 he wrote: 
“A satisficing decision procedure can be often turned into a procedure for optimizing by 
introducing a rule for optimal amount of search, or, what amounts to the same thing, a rule for 
fixing the aspiration level optimally.” (Simon 1972, p.170) 
This note tries to restore the methodological equilibrium. The paper demonstrates how a 
satisficing decision procedure results in an optimal search-stopping rule and in an optimal 
consumption-leisure choice. 1 
                                            
1 This paper represents the synthesis of two pre-print working papers, “Satisficing Decision Procedure and Optimal 
Consumption-Leisure Choice” and “A Paradox of Lille Pre-purchase Search for Durables: the trade-off between 
prices, product lifecycle, and savings on purchases”, available at http://works.bepress.com/sergey_malakhov. The 
article leaves beyond the scope of analysis the voluminous literature on the search behavior. The review of those 
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2. Satisficing Price Decision and Optimal Search-Stopping Rule 
 
Let us start with the famous distinction between an optimizing model and a satisficing model. In 
1978 H.Simon wrote:  
“In an optimizing model, the correct point of termination is found by equating the marginal cost 
of search with the (expected) marginal improvement in the set of alternatives. In a satisficing 
model, search terminates when the best offer exceeds an aspiration level that itself adjusts 
gradually to the value of the offers received so far” (Simon 1978, p.10).  
Suppose a consumer who reserves the labor income wL0 for the purchase of an item Q =1. He 
begins to search from the starting price of the search PS > wL0  and he concludes the search at the 
satisficing purchase price PP  <wL0. We assume that the search S diminishes both labor time L 
and leisure time H (∂L/∂S<0; ∂H/∂S<0). 
Let us analyze the intersection of two curves, the expenditures P(S) curve and the labor income 
wL(S) curve, where T is the time horizon of the consumption-leisure choice (T = L + S +H), the 
value w×∂L/∂S is negative (w×∂L/∂S<0), because the best offer PP=wL exceeds the aspiration 
level wL0  and the value ∂P/∂S, which is exposed at the moment of purchase by the tangent dotted 
line, is also negative, now with regard to the assumption of the diminishing marginal efficiency 
of search (Figure 1): 
Шаг$41$tangent$to$P(S)$PS1PP=dP(S)$
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Figure 1. Reservation level, the starting price, and the purchase price 
 
If the value PP is equal to the actual labor income wL(S) at the moment of purchase, the slope of 
the wage rate (-w) gives us the value of the labor time L required for the purchase on horizontal 
axis. In addition, it also gives us the value P0 on the vertical axis, which is equal to the potential 
labor income (Figure 2), or  
P0 = w(L+ S) (1)  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
studies has been done in the first presentation of the model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice under price 
dispersion (Malakhov 2011). Here, the attention is concentrated on the illustrations of satisficing consumer 
behavior. 
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Figure 2. Actual vs. potential labor income 
 
The Figure 2 shows that the absolute value of the decrease in the potential labor income at the 
moment of purchase is greater than the absolute value of the decrease in the actual labor income, 
or w >|w×∂L/∂S|. This consideration attracts attention to the core function L(S). Indeed, when we 
take the values ∂P/∂S<0, ∂2P/∂S2>0 of the expenditures’ function P(S), we simply follow the 
assumption of the diminishing marginal efficiency of search. However, the behavior of the L(S) 
function is not so clear. 
When the search S “squeezes out” the labor L and the leisure H from the given time horizon T, 
like ice displaces both whiskey and soda in the glass, the ∂L/∂S rate directly depends on the 
value ∂H/∂S because ∂L/∂S+1+∂H/∂S=0. However, the value ∂H/∂S can be determined by a 
very simple rule. If we take the differential dH(S), we can see that the absolute rate of the 
decrease in leisure time is equal to its share in the time horizon, or |∂H/∂S|=H/T and H/T= - 
∂H/∂S. From here we can get the value of the propensity to search ∂L/∂S. It is negative because 
the labor and the search represent alternative sources of income. We can also get the derivatives 
of propensity to search, which are very important for our analysis: 
L(S) =T −H (S)− S;
∂L / ∂S = −∂H / ∂S −1;
dH (S) = dS ∂H
∂S
= −dS H
T
⇓
∂L
∂S
= −
∂H
∂S
−1= H
T
−1= H −T
T
= −
L+ S
T
(2.1)
∂L
∂S
=
H −T
T
⇒∂2L / ∂S∂H =1/T ; (2.2)
∂L
∂S
= −
L+ S
T
⇒∂2L / ∂S 2 = −∂L / ∂S +1
T
< 0 (2.3)
2
 
If at the moment of purchase the marginal loss in labor income is equal to the marginal benefit of 
the search, the Equation (2.1) gives us: 
Q ∂P
∂S
= w ∂L
∂S
= w H −T
T
= −w L+ S
T
(3)  
If we re-arrange the Equations (1) and (3) for the value of consumption Q=1, we see that the 
value of potential labor income is equal to the value of the time horizon times the value of the 
price reduction at the moment of purchase (Figure 3), or 
                                            
2 Here, the value of the propensity to search is limited by the inequality -1<∂L/∂S<0. This inequality represents the 
“common model” of behavior. When the absolute value of the propensity to search becomes greater than one, or 
∂L/∂S<-1, the values ∂H/∂S and ∂Q/∂H become positive, the “leisure model” of behavior takes place and it results in 
the Veblen effect. There, the satisficing cognitive mechanism of the goal termination stops working and the 
mechanism of aspiration takes place (Malakhov 2013, 2014). 
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P0 = −T ×∂P / ∂S = w(L+ S) (4)  
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Figure 3. Potential labor income, price reduction, and time horizon 
 
3. Satisficing Marginal Decision: indirect proof 
 
Now we can proceed to the indirect proof of the correspondence of the optimal search-stopping 
rule to the satisficing choice. 
Let us take the “apple of discord” between psychologists and economists. We presuppose that at 
the moment of purchase the absolute value of the marginal decrease in the labor income for the 
given wage rate w is still less than the marginal benefit of the search, or:3 
w ∂L
∂S <
∂P
∂S (5)  
It seems that the optimizing approach requires continuing the search while the satisficing 
decision has already stopped it. However, the Equation 4 tells us that this case should result in 
the hypothetical value P0’, where we comes to the following inequality for the given wage rate 
w: 
P0 ' = w(L '+ S ') < P0 = w(L+ S) (6)  
Due to the rule ∂2L/∂S2<0 from the Equation (2.3), the inequality (L’+S’)<(L+S) produces the 
following inequalities:  L’ >L and S’ <S. And we can see that our assumption is false, because 
either the hypothetical amount of search S’ should be less than the actual amount of search S and 
the greater hypothetical amount of labor L’ results in a greater purchase price P’P >PP, or the 
actual amount of search S should diminish the labor time required for the purchase and it should 
result in the value P’P <PP. 
We can graphically confirm the last consideration, if we take the [P’0;L’] line, which also has the 
(-w) slope (Figure 4):  
Шаг$44$
$Suppose$wL/S<P/S$then$from$eq$w(L+S)<;TP/S$but$for$given$w…$
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Figure 4.The indirect proof of the equality of the marginal values of search 
 
                                            
3 The absolute values do not change the logic of the proof but they simplify the presentation of the model. 
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The same indirect proof can be applied when it is supposed that at the purchase price level the 
marginal costs of search are decreasing faster than its marginal benefit. The only difference is 
that this case can be eliminated from the analysis by definition, because it requires recognition 
that the chosen price is not satisficing. The satisficing cognitive mechanism stops working and 
the mechanism of discouragement takes place.4 Indeed, we can reproduce the set of inequalities, 
which describe the dissatisfying choice, when a high price corresponds to unexpectedly low 
savings on purchase and the loss in labor income is greater than savings on purchase: 
w∂L
∂S >
∂P
∂S (7)  
dS w∂L
∂S > dS
∂P
∂S (8)
dwL(S)> dP(S)
 
When the inequalities (5) and (7) are false, the Equation (3) takes place. Now we can say that 
when the consumer chooses the satisficing price, his decision automatically equalizes the 
marginal loss in the labor income with the marginal benefit of the search.  
This proof can be repeated for any pre-allocated quantity Q. There, the Equation (4) takes the 
following form: 
QP0 = - T×Q×∂P/∂S = w×(L+S)         (9) 5 
The Figure 4 provides us with another interesting consideration. Let us pay attention to the 
situation when the same amount of search S results in a price P’P<<wL0, i.e., when the best 
offer, an unexpected price discount, for example, significantly exceeds the aspiration level – the 
case that can really challenge the optimizing approach. Here we realize that the absolute value of 
the actual price reduction |∂P/∂S| is greater than its planned value |dP/dS|. It seems that if the 
consumer accepts this price, he doesn’t equalize marginal costs of the search |w×∂L/∂S| with its 
marginal benefit |∂P/∂S|. 
However, this decision changes not only the value of the marginal benefit of the search but it 
also changes both the propensity to search and the marginal loss in the labor income. It happens 
because the choice of the lower price decreases, as Figure 4 shows and the Equation (1) proves 
it, the value T of the time horizon of the consumption-leisure choice.  
The time horizon of the consumption-leisure choice, i.e., the time to the next purchase, depends 
on products’ lifecycles. The lower price can exhibit the coming expiration date for pork 
sausages, for example.  
If we remember the famous metaphor of M.Friedman and L.J.Savage, when they compared 
economic agents with billiard players, who make their shots as if they know the complicated 
mathematical formulas, we should not forget that billiard is played by two people. The seller 
doesn’t bother about consumer’s marginal values of search, but either he cut the price for before-
yesterday “fresh” sausages, or he offers packed pork sausages with extended shelf life. In 
addition, if the consumer buys before-yesterday “fresh” sausages, he should quickly eat them, 
i.e., to cut leisure time H, reserved for the consumption. 
If the consumer doesn’t accept this lower price because he estimates it as too high price for the 
shorter shelf life, we meet again inequalities (7) and (8) of the dissatisfying choice. So, the 
                                            
4 The description of the cognitive mechanisms was presented by H.Simon in the Psychological Review in 1967 
(Simon 1967). 
5 Here, the value of the time horizon T is predetermined. The consumer simply adjusts his choice for his habitual 
intensity of consumption Q/H with respect to the given time horizon, a week, for example. However, when the 
habitual intensity of consumption, i.e., stable preferences, needs an extension of the time horizon with regard to the 
increase in quantity to be purchased, or when T=T(Q), we can see how the dissatisfying decision becomes 
satisficing. The analysis of the satisficing decision under the assumption T=T(Q) is left beyond the scope of this 
analysis because in needs the reconsideration of the phenomenon of sunk costs of consumer search. This extension 
of the analysis of satisficing decision is presented in the paper “Sunk Costs of Consumer Search: Economic 
Rationality of Satisficing Decision”, available at http://works.bepress.com/sergey_malakhov and forthcoming in 
Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, Volume 5, Issue 1(9), Summer 2014. 
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producer should support the shorter shelf life by the corresponding price discount |P’P - PP| 
(Figure 5): 
Шаг$45$
$
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Figure 5. Price discount for the short shelf life 
Now, the new search path P’(S) meets the decrease in the labor income wL’(S) at the point 
(S;P’P). The P’(S) curve becomes steeper due to the price discount and the wL’(S) curve 
becomes steeper due to the shorten time horizon T’. So, for the same amount of the search S and 
for the labor income required for the purchase wL’<wL we have  
∂P '
∂S
= w∂L '
∂S
= −w L '+ S
T '
(10)  
The time horizon T’ is cut here not only by the decrease in the labor time L but also by the 
decrease in time of consumption, i.e., leisure time H, or ΔT=ΔL+ΔH. So, the absolute value of 
the propensity to search |∂L/∂S| becomes greater. In addition, the [P’0;T’] line also becomes 
steeper than the initial [P0;T] line because the absolute value of the equilibrium price reduction 
|∂P/∂S| becomes greater.6 
This example provides us with the deeper understanding of the phenomenon of the visual 
disparity between the satisficing approach and the optimizing model. Let us come back to the 
“apple of discord”, i.e., to the inequality of marginal values of search, or |w×∂L/∂S|<|∂P/∂S| and, 
as a result, to the inequality w(L +S)<P0. 
If we analyze the value of propensity to search ∂L/∂S, we can see that its absolute value |∂L/∂S| 
can be raised to the level of the equality with the absolute value of price reduction |∂P/∂S | in two 
ways. One way is to search more intensively and to increase the (L + S) value with the help of 
the ∂2L/∂S2<0 rate. But there is another way. If the individual cuts the time horizon T, he also 
increases the absolute value of the marginal costs of search |w×∂L/∂S|. Why the decrease in the 
time horizon happens here? 
Let us imagine two low-wage rate individuals who enter the high-price suit store. The first 
visitor does not accept high prices while the second visitor makes the purchase. We understand 
that they have different reservation prices. The first consumer decides either to search for a lower 
price or to wait for sales. And the second consumer is more impatient. He accepts the high price, 
which is satisficing for him. His impatience increases the reservation level and it also hastens 
the moment of consumption. Moreover, the impatience intensifies the consumption. When the 
first visitor finally buys the chosen suit at a lower price at sales he will put it on occasionally. 
However, when the impatient consumer buys the high-price suit he will often wear it because he 
likes it more than his friend. 
We can check all these considerations by the Equation (3). We suppose that both visitors have 
the same potential labor income w(L +S). (This assumption will be validated in Part 4.) But they 
have different time horizons because they have either different intensity of consumption Q/H 
and/or different attitudes to fashion products. The first consumer can wait for sales while the 
                                            
6 In addition, the Fig.5 explains why sellers of high-quality products with long-term lifecycles and guarantees can 
leave the market because, like it happens with ‘lemons’, sellers of low-quality products without guarantees or with 
short “shelf lives” reduce prices.  
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second cannot. On the other hand, when the impatient consumer intends to wear new fashion suit 
often and in current season, he decreases both the total time of its consumption, i.e., the leisure 
time, and the time horizon. Evidently, in this case the suit either becomes shabby soon or it goes 
out of vogue. But the decrease in the time horizon increases the absolute value of the marginal 
costs of search |w×∂L/∂S|. And this new value of |w×∂L/∂S| meets the high value of the price 
reduction |∂P/∂S|:7  
P0 = w(L+ S) = −T1 ×∂P1 / ∂S1 = −T2 ×∂P2 / ∂S2;
T1 >T2 ⇒|∂P1 / ∂S1 |<|∂P2 / ∂S2 | (11)
 
The high price becomes satisficing for the impatient consumer while it stays above the 
reservation level of the first consumer. 
This example shows how the fashion can increase the reservation level and at the same time it 
can cut the “shelf life” of the chosen item. However, there are markets where all consumers are 
impatient as well as intensive in consumption. The fish market represents a good example of this 
kind of the total impatience.  
 
4. Optimization of Satisficing Decision 
 
The model presented here describes the sequential search as the passage from one value of 
marginal savings |∂P/∂S| to the other |∂P/∂S| value with a predetermined consumption Q. In this 
sense the sequential search is a dynamic process. However, this consideration also gives us the 
orthogonal view. We can solve the optimization problem for a static |∂P/∂S| value.  
It seems that the optimization of the utility function U=U(Q,H) is not possible here due to the 
predetermined value of Q and respectively due to the value ∂Q/∂H=0. However, the really static 
methodology overrides this problem. We can come back to H.Leibenstein’s definition of “of a 
static situation as one in which the order of events is of no significance”. (Leibenstein, 1950, 
p.187). And we can take either a consumer who stops the search at a certain |∂P/∂S| value and 
who decides after that how much he should consume for the given time horizon, a week, for 
example, and how much he should work in order to buy the chosen quantity, or a consumer who 
implicitly makes the consumption-leisure trade-off before he enters the particular market. In 
these both senses, the derivative ∂Q/∂H really takes place because the consumption-leisure trade-
off takes place. 
Beauty'
TH*
U (Q,H )
w∂L/∂S
∂P /∂S
=Q*
L+S H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
 
Figure 6. Satisficing optimal consumer choice 
                                            
7 Here, we should keep in mind that for the given product lifecycle the greater purchase price corresponds to the 
greater absolute value of the price reduction |∂P/∂S| due to the rule of the diminishing efficiency of search 
(∂P/∂S<0; ∂2P/∂S2>0). The opposite statement, as the example of before-yesterday pork sausages demonstrates, is 
not always true. 
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Let us suppose that a consumer has no liquidity constraint, for example, due to his strong 
precautionary motive (Carroll 2001, Malakhov 2011). Then, we can solve the static optimization 
problem of his consumption-leisure choice not with regard to the liquidity constraint but with 
regard to the equality of the marginal values of search, where the utility function has the 
common Cobb-Douglas form U(Q,H) = Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S =Q(L+S)/THH/T  and the budget constraint 
line connects the time horizon T with the corner solution for leisure (H=0; ∂L/∂S=-1) (Figure 6). 
As a result, we have the following Lagrangian equation:8 
Λ =U (Q,H )+λ(w−Q ∂P / ∂S
∂L / ∂S
) (12)  
If we take the value ∂P/∂S as the value given by a particular local market, either by a 
convenient store or a supermarket, we can solve the optimization problem U(Q,H) of the 
consumption-leisure choice with regard to this particular market, keeping in mind the 
derivative of the propensity to search from the Equation (2.2): 
∂U
∂Q
= λ
∂P / ∂S
∂L / ∂S
; ∂U
∂H
= −λw∂
2L / ∂S∂H
∂L / ∂S
;
∂U / ∂H
∂U / ∂Q
=MRS(HforQ) = − w
∂P / ∂S
∂2L / ∂S∂H = − w
T ×∂P / ∂S
=
w
P0
(13)
 
The marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption MRS (H for Q) is determined here 
not by the purchase price like in the classical model of the individual labor supply but by the 
price equivalent of the potential labor income. The Equation (13) tells us that the value of 
potential labor income corresponds to the equilibrium price. Indeed, while the monetary loss 
during the search is equal to the value dS×w×∂L/∂S, the costs of search or transaction costs are 
equal to the value w×dS.  So, the equilibrium price is equal to the sum of labor costs and 
transaction costs. If we come back to two friends regarding the fashion suit, we can see that 
although they have different reservation prices, the equilibrium price is unique and it is equal to 
their potential labor income. 
The graphic illustration of the optimization problem shows that the marginal rate of substitution 
is equal to the common microeconomics ratio of consumption to non-leisure time, or  
MRS(H forQ) = − ∂Q
∂H
=
Q*
L+ S
=
w
P0
(14)  
However, when we combine this result with the Equation (13), we get another confirmation of 
the Equation (9) and another illustration for the equilibrium price: 
MRS(HforQ) = − ∂Q
∂H
=
Q*
L+ S
=
w
P0
;
w(L+ S) =Q*P0 (15)
 
 
5. Application of Satisficing Optimal Decision: Paradox of Little Pre-Purchase Search for 
Big-Ticket Items 
 
Our analysis discovers the general relationship between marginal savings on purchases ∂P/∂S, 
the time horizon of the consumption-leisure choice, and the potential labor income: 
−
∂P
∂S
=
P0
T
(16)
 This relationship can be illustrated by the paradox of little pre-purchase search for big-ticket 
items. In 1979 Kapteyn et al. published the results of the survey on consumer behavior. The 
                                            
8 The analysis of the marginal utility of money income λ demonstrates the equivalence of the marginal utilities of 
consumption and leisure in the satisficing optimal model with the corresponding values in the classical model of the 
individual labor supply (Malakhov 2013). 
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author found that purchase decision concerned durables had been satisficing rather than 
maximizing (Kapteyn et al. 1979). Later Grewal and Marmorstein made the following comment 
to those results:
   “Previous studies have consistently found that most consumers undertake relatively little pre-
purchase search for durable goods and do even less price-comparison shopping,.. (when) prices 
of the more expensive products tend to exhibit the greatest variation across stores. Given the 
aforementioned evidence regarding the price variation of big-ticket items, it appears that many 
consumers engage in considerably less price search than is predicted by the economics-of-
information theory.” (Grewal and Marmorstein 1994, p.453) 
R.Thaler documented that anomaly in the following manner: 
“One application of marginal analysis is optimal search. Search for the lowest price should 
continue until the expected marginal gain equals the value of the search costs. This is likely to be 
violated if the context of the search influences the perception of the value of the savings. In 
Thaler (1980), I argued that individuals were more likely to spend 20 minutes to save $5 on the 
purchase of a $25 clock radio than to save the same amount on the purchase of a $500 
television.” (Thaler 1987, pp.110-111) 
We can check the results of R.Thaler’s experiment in order to show that there was no anomaly 
and that the case did not conflict with the marginal approach. 
Suppose an individual who is ready to give up 20 hours of leisure to get (i.e., to work and to 
search for) a big-ticket item Qbti and only 1 hour of leisure to get a cheap item Qci. If we take the 
value dP as the constant, “the same amount” in R.Thaler’s experiment, for both items and, when 
S0=0 and S=dS, we have: 
 
∂P
∂S
= w ∂L
∂S
= −w L+ S
T
; dP(S) = dS ∂P
∂S
= −w L+ S
T
dS;
dP(S)= −w Lbti + Sbti
T
dSbti = −w
Lci + Sci
T
dSci ; (17)
dP(S) = −w 20
T
dSbti = −w
1
T
dSci ;
20Sbti = Sci
 
 
When the individual finally makes these both purchases, he realizes that he has spent twenty 
times more on the search for the cheap item than on the search for the big-ticket item. The advice 
of “a reliable friend” to go to the other shop for $5 discount in R.Thaler’s experiment could not 
give more than a minute to exit from the shop, to enter into another shop, and to buy there the 
$500 TV with $5 discount. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of the paradox of little pre-purchase search for big-ticket items follows the general 
idea of the paper – economic agents are more rational in everyday life that it is usually 
considered. The observed anomalies of economic behavior don’t illustrate irrationality but they 
need deeper economic understanding, which could reinforce the predictive power of economic 
considerations. 
The application of the optimization rule to the satisficing consumer decision simply represents 
the illustration of Friedman-Savage billiard metaphor. Here, the billiard shot corresponds to the 
explicit satisficing procedure, while the physical trajectory of a ball corresponds to the implicit 
optimization rule. Hence, the lucky shot shows how a psychological satisficing decision results 
in a natural optimal outcome. 
The model of satisficing optimal decision also gives us an interpretation of P.Diamond’s paradox 
(Diamond 1971). This paradox states the fact that when search costs are positive, the equilibrium 
price becomes a monopoly price. And in the model presented here the equilibrium price also is 
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not equal to the purchase price. However, the value of potential labor income could be hardly 
esteemed as a monopoly price. If a monopoly sets its price at the level of potential labor income, 
workers should substitute search by labor. As a result, the labor market decreases the wage rate 
in response to this additional labor supply and the monopoly price becomes unattainable.  
The model proposes another methodological explanation of the difference between a purchase 
price and an equilibrium price. The search produces the monetary loss in labor income with 
regard to the reservation price or to the willingness to pay (WTP=wL0). Here, the value of 
|w×∂L/∂S| is equal to the marginal loss in labor income in the explicit monetary model and to the 
marginal value of leisure in the implicit model of utility. 9 However, if a consumer decides to sell 
an item after the purchase he takes into account not the monetary loss but the costs of search, 
which should be total but not marginal.  Therefore, he takes into account the wage rate and the 
time of search, or to the value wS. And here we come to consumer’s willingness to accept 
(WTA). This consideration results in the assumption that when search costs are positive the 
equilibrium price is equal to the willingness to accept. This assumption becomes more plausible 
if we consider home production to be a specific form of search, where the purchase price is equal 
to the price of inputs and the equilibrium price or the willingness to accept is equal to the sum of 
the price of inputs wL and the transformation costs wS.  
The correspondence of the equilibrium price to the willingness to accept could explain the WTP-
WTA disparity documented in many studies (see, for example, Horowitz et al. 2003). However, 
if we find the satisficing price at the beginning of the search (i.e., S=0) and the WTP-WTA 
disparity disappears. The utility function takes the following form U(Q,H)= Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S 
=QL/THH/T , the values of equilibrium marginal utilities of both consumption and leisure become 
equal to the corresponding values in the classical model of individual labor supply, and the 
Hicksian WTP-WTA equivalence takes place. In addition, the potential labor income, i.e, the 
equilibrium price, becomes equal to the purchase price. The market becomes perfect. 
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